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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent, 
vs. 
WILLIAM GIBSON McLAUGHLIN 




BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE 
William Gibson McLaughlin and Dennis Becker appeal 
from a c'onviction of wilfully and maliciously breaking into 
a coin box associated with a public telephone instrument in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-48-28 (Supp. 1967). 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The defendants waived their right to trial by jury and 
were tried and convicted of the above charges before the 
Honorable C. Nelson Day, Judge of the Fifth Judicial Dist-
rict, on July 12, 1967. On July 31, 1967, Judge Day sentenced 
the defendants to the Utah State Prison for a term not ex-
ceeding five (5) years, the term to commence on May 8, 1967. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirm<ttion of the lower court con-
victions. 
STATEMENT OF FACT'S 
On the morning of May 8, 1967, at 5 :30 a.m., Clinton A. 
Nisson was awakened by a commotion outside his store 
where he also resided in the town of Washington, Utah. 
Arising from his bed, he observed from his bedroom window 
two young men, one of whom was outside watching while 
the other was in the public telephone 'booth in the process 
of removing the telephone. Although it was still dark, there 
wa:s adequate light from the phone booth and a large street 
light nearby for Mr. Nisson to see tha't the one outside of 
the booth was wearing a white shirt and that the one inside 
working on the phone was wearing blue or dark trousers 
and shirt (Tr. 58-59). There was a dark car with large round 
taillights backed up to the booth but facing away from the 
observer. After being certain about what was going on, Nis-
son phoned the State Highway Patrol during which time 
the removal of the phone was completed, its captors 
having fled from the scene with certain parts including the 
coin box and the money therein. 
Simultaneously with the phone call, however, the dis-
patcher at the patrol station about two miles away had alert-
ed Officer Joseph A. Pfoutz of the St. George Police who 
intercepted the car <is it entered the on-ramp to the freeway 
about nine-tenths of a mile from Nisson's store. Responding 
to the officer's flashing light, the car stopped on the free-
way approximately one quarter of a mile towards Cedar City 
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from the on-ramp and the two defendants in this case met 
the officer at the rear of the car and asked what the trouble 
was. Officer Pfoutz replied that he had received a report 
of a phone being burglarized in Washington. To this de-
fendant McLaughlin stated that he had been in the booth, 
but only to look for a phone number of a friend of his aunts 
(Tr.94). Defendants were held at the rear of the car, along 
with two young women who were passengers, one of whom 
was the car's owner, until aid requested by the officer ar-
rived. 
Mr. Nissan arrived within five minutes and identified 
the tW'o defendants, McLaughlin and Becker, as well as the 
car, as being those he had observed minutes earlier at the 
phone booth near his store. The car was a dark 1964 Ford 
convertible, equipped with large, round tail-lights, distinc-
tive of that make and year. (Tr. 12) 
Shortly thereafter, within fifteen minutes, Trooper Don-
ald A. Best and Hyrum M. Ipson of the State Highway Pa-
trol arrived as did Sergeant Blondie Porter of the St. George 
Police Department. All four occupants were placed under 
arrest and taken to the St. George City Jail where they were 
warned of their constitutional rights, first by Officer Hy-
rum Ipson and later, when he arrived, by Evan Whitehead, 
Sheriff of Washington County. (Tr. 24) 
The car was guarded by Dall J. Winn of the State Fish 
and Game Department until taken to the compound by City 
Jail officials about an hour later. It was searched pursuant 
to a warrant at about 11 :00 a.m. and revealed several items 
including one cant hook, one telephone coin box, one tele-
phone coin box housing, one coin bag and other tools which 
4 
appeared to have been used in the removal of the phone. 
This evidence was suppressed at the trial as having been 
illegally obtained. 
The reason for the s11ppression appears to have been 
that there was an improper return on the search warrant in 
addition to the fact that there was some testimony to the 
effect that some of the items, namely the coin box, coins, the 
coin box housing and a cloth under which they had been 
hidden in the back seat of the impounded auto, had been 
removed from the automobile anrl placed in the patrol car 
while driving to the city jail one hour after the arrest. The 
items were then placed back into the automobile to await 
rhe search by warrant. This, counsel for the defendant ar-
gued was not incident to the arrest, was improper 'as being 
without warrant, and vitiated any subsequent search by a 
warrant, in addition to the fact that the warrant did not 
have a proper return. Although several of the officers had 
viewed the coin box and coin box housing under the cloth 
in rhe rear se'at at the time of the arrest, the items were not 
seized at tha:t time and the trial judge held that there had 
been no search incident to an arrest. 
Ten days later, on or about the morning of May 18, at 
about 2 :00 a.m., Officer Pfoutz in the jail at St. George was 
addressed by defendant Becker concerning some reading 
material that he, Officer Pfoutz, had in his hands. When the 
Officer replied that he was reading the complaint, the de-
fendant requested that he read the complain't out loud. When 
the part of the complaint which contained the words "wil-
fully and maliciously tampering with a coin box associated 
with a public telephone" were read, defendant McLaughlin 
exclaimed that they had not done it maliciously but had 
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done it for the money. Defendant Becker, voicing no ob-
jection to this admission, remained si'lent. (Tr. 27) 
At the time of trial the defendants waived their right 
to trial by jury and presented no evidence on their own be-
halves. Following the trial the two young women were re-
leased on mo'tion of counsel for defendants. A motion to 
release defendants McLaughlin and Becker was denied. The 
defendants were sentenced by Judge Day on July 31, 1967, 
to the Utah State Prison for a term not exceeding five years. 
ARGUMENT 
POlNT I 
DEFENDANTS WERE NOT DEPRIVED OF DUE 
PROCESS NOR OF ANY OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHT BY VIRTUE OF THE FACT THAT A WIT-
NESS AT THE TRIAL STATED INTO THE RECORD 
THAT DEFENDANTS HAD ASKED FOR AN ATTOR-
NEY AFTER BEING GIVEN A PREINTERROGATION 
WARNING 
In the course of the trial, after Officer Pfoutz had 
testified that all of the defendants were present at the time 
he overheard Sheriff Whitehead advise them of their rights 
he was asked to relate what happened next. Having some 
difficulty with expressing what went on, he was asked to 
summarize what the defendants did or said, to which he 
stated that they wanted an attorney. Defendants now charge 
that this statement is being used as a negative inference of 
their guilt in violation of their rights to receive a warning 
or advice that they have a right to counsel under the Fifth 
Amendment. Defendants also allege that this was admitted 
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into evidence and considered by the Judge over the objec-
tion of counsel. Perhaps the best way to evaluate what 
happened would be to look at the transcript (Tr.96-97). 
Q. Were all of the defendants present at the time 
you overheard Officer Whitehead advise them of 
their rights? 
A. Yes, sir. I believe so, yes, sir. 
Q. What happened next? 
A. The two gentlemen indicated that they didn't-
MR. PICKETT: Just a minute. We object to any 
indication or interpretation, any indications. 
Q. (By Mr. Burns) State what you did. 
THE COURT: Mr. Witness, when you say they 
indicated, why, that's your conclusion as to what 
they did. You may state the substance of what they 
said. No one will expect you to remember their exact 
language at this time, unless it was taken down 
electron;_cally or like the court reporter is doing 
now; but you may state in substance what was said, 
if you remember. 
THE WITNESS: They said that-didn't say a heck 
of a lot. They did want an attorney. 
MR. PICKETT: Now, just a minute, your honor, 
when they say there are four of them, we would 
like to know-
MR. BURNS: May I withdray the question, your 
honor? I withdraw the last question and will move 
forward into a different area. 
THE COURT: His answer may stand that they 
wanted an attorney, that may stand, that's the sub-
stance of what he was going to say, anyway. 
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It is apparent from the transcript that there was no 
objection to what the witne,,s said. The objection originally 
was to any interpretation or conclusions regarding indica-
tions given by the defendants, as related by the witness. 
The later objection, it is obvious, was to the fact that th'e 
statement that they wanted an attorney, was attributed to 
the four of them rather than to any particular individual. 
Counsel for the defendants was about to say or to require 
that the witness stipulate which one indicated drat they 
wanted ·an attorney. 
MR. PICKETT: Now, just a minute, your honor, 
when they say there are four of them, we would like 
to know-
In other words, it did not even enter the mind of counsel 
for the defendants that there was any objectionable nature 
to the statement that they indicated that they wanted an at-
torney. This is borne ont by the fact that no form.al objection 
was preserved so that this issue could be properly heard on 
appeal. 
Even if counsel at that time had objected, it is only by 
a stretch of the imagination that anyone could conceive of 
how this could be error. especially prejudicial error. Every-
one is well aware of the right of the defendants to defend 
themselves at trial and to have counsel appointed for this 
purpose. What better indication is there that the defendants 
asked for counsel than that the defendants appeared in cour't 
with counsel. Should the mere presence of counsel negative-
ly infer that defendants are guilty? Why then should the 
protected right to ask for counsel be considered capable of 
negatively inferring guilt? It seems quite clear that even 
a person who deems himself innocent of the crime charged 
would want to be defended by professional counsel and 
would so request the court to appoin1t one if he were indigent 
and had no means to retain counsel for himself. Such request, 
although stated into the record, has no negative inference 
of guilt. Furthermore, counsel for the respondent, sensing 
that the question and the evidence thereby introduced was 
in no way valuable to the respondent's case, withdrew the 
question and moved into another area. 
Counsel for the respondent made no comment imply-
ing that the indication had any evidenciary import. 
All o'f the cases cited by the defendants alluding to the 
consthutional status of this rig-ht deal only with the right 
against self-incrimination. The state admits that it is errcr, 
and in most instances prejudicial error, to imply to the jury 
that the accused's refusal to testify is a negative inference 
of his guilt. This, however, is not what happened in this 
case. FurthP-rmore, the defendants have not found one case 
attributing deprivation of constitu'tional rights to due pro-
cess to the fact that it was casually stated into evidence that 
the defendants wanted an attorney after being warned of 
their rights. 
All of the cases cited by the defendants, alluding to 
the constitutional stat'!.ls of this right, deal only with the 
right against self-incrimination, and in most of those cases, 
counsel for the prosecution specifically, in some manner, 
made reference 1to their remaining silent. 
POINT II 
INTRODUCTION INTO EVIDENCE OF THE DEC· 
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LARATION OF DEFENDANT WILLIAM GIBSON 
McLAUGHLIN WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL ERROR AS 
TO DENNIS BECKER AND WAS NOT A VIOLATION 
OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO CONFRONTA-
TION. 
Defendants cite the recent case of Bruton v. United 
States, 88 S.Ct. 1620 (1968) as support for their position 
that receiving into evidence of an admission made by de-
fendant William G. McLaughlin was error as to Dennis 
Becker and denied his right to confrontation. Respondent 
submits, however, that the Brnton case does not apply here. 
In that case one defendant implicated his co-partner in crime 
in a confession given to a postal inspector. The confessions 
there were two by the same individual, and were excluded 
from evidence as being taken in violation of the recent Mir-
anda case, and the confessor was turned free. His alleged 
co-partner, Bruton, however, was convicted upon the evi-
dence admitted, which included the implication from the 
confession of his companion in crime. In that case the Su-
preme Court he'ld that the admitting into evidence of the 
confession implica1ting the petitioner wa3 unconstitutional 
and prejudicial error as it deprived the petitioner of his con-
stitutional right to cross exomination or confrontation. Our 
situation is distinguishable from the facts in the Bruton 
case. 
There was no private confession by one of the defend-
ants to a law enforcement officer here. In the instant case 
defendant Becker was present when defendant McLaughlin 
uttered the admission and remained silent, making no denial 
thereof. Defendant Becker's silence thereof should be con-
sidered as a silent admission of guilt or tending to be a silent 
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admission of guilt. There is no question but what the state-
ment is otherwise admissible as an exception to the hearsay 
rule. There is more than ample law on that point. 
Defendants, however, rai'se the case of Farnsworth v. 
State, 14 U.2d 303, 383 P.2d 489 (1963) and say that in that 
case, involving similar circumstances (confinement in jail), 
the Supreme Court of this state held that the silence of one 
defendant, even when present at the time an incriminating 
statement was made by the other defendant, the co-partner 
in crime could not be used as a silent admission tending 
toward his guilt. Defendants attempt to bring the 'facts of 
their case within Farnsworth and do so erroneously. In that 
case the court set forth several conditions necessary to con-
stitute an admission of guilt by silence and held that only 
one condition was not met, namely that the declaration was 
one to which an innocent man is the situafion of the de-
fendant would reply. In the Farnsworth case the defendant 
had already confessed. Although the statement was made in 
the cell it was made in the presence of other prisoners and 
not in the presence of a law enforcement officer. The natural 
conclusion in that case for defendant to make was tha:t, true 
to the silent code of partners in crime, the statement would 
never be heard outside tlle inner circles of the suspects 
themselves and that the defendant would never be faced 
with the problem of answering its implication's. In our case, 
defendant McLaughlin had not confessed to the crime 
charged. A law enforcement officer was present and more· 
over defendant Becker had been the one who had initially 
engaged the officer in the conversation requesting that he 
read the complaint. The natural thing for him to have done 
would have been to deny the complaint, but be that as it may, 
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the statement made by McLaughlin was interjected as a 
parenthetical or added statement to Becker's conversation 
in such a way as to make it appear that it came from 
Becker. The natural response here would be to conclude 
that from the statement the officer would believe that 'the 
defendants had committed the crime, and it seems fairly 
logical to conclude that an innocent man in the po'sition of 
defendant Becker would have protested the dedar'ati'on by 
defendant McLaughlin. The failure o{ defendant Becker 
to do so indicates a consciousness of guilt. Respondent sub-
mits that it would be difficult indeed to find circumstances 
that would be more conducive to such a natural response 
than die circumstances in the case at bar. 
The least that can be said is defendant Becker was not 
denied his right to confrontation. Defendant McLaughlin 
was not dismissed and discharged from the case as was the 
defendant who confessed in the B,ruton case cited by de-
fendants here. He was available for questioning subject to 
the assertion of his right to remain silent under the Fifth 
Amendment. He was not, however, put to this test. Defend-
ant Becker never protested this sfatement no,r presented 
any other evidence in the trial below. 
POINT Ill 
DEFENSE COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO PRE'SERVE 
OBJECTIONS AT THE TRIAL COURT PRECLUDES 
THE RAl'SING OF THESE ISSUES ON APPEAL. 
As before noted, the purpose of defense counsel's ob-
jection to the acceptance or stating into the record of the 
fact that defendants had asked for an attorney after being 
given preinterrogation warnings was not as such objected to 
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at the trial. The objection there for other purposes cannot 
form the basis of appeal here to the effect that there has 
been a violation of defendants' Fourteenth Amendment 
rights to receive warning and instruction of their right to 
counsel. Furthermore, such objection as was made was not 
preserved in the record for appeal. There was no objection 
whatsoever by defense counsel to the admission into evi-
dence of the declaration agains't interest made by McLaugh-
lin in the St. George Jail, either on behalf of McLaughlin 
himself or defendant Becker. Therefore, appellants are fur-
ther precluded from raising on appeal these objections as 
error in the pro·ceedings. If such were error, they cannot 
now be raised for the first time before this court. 
This court has indicated that on occasion it will notice 
errors not objected to which are committed at the trial court 
level, but that this prerogative will be exercised only "rare-
ly and with caution in an awareness of the importance of 
timely and proper objections." State v. Smith, 16 U.2d 374, 
401 P.2d 445 (1965). 
In the case of State v. Nelson, 12 U.2d 177, 364 P.2d 409 
(1961) this court said: 
Even the 'absence of an objection this court might 
nevertheless take note of and correct and take egreg-
ious error. But this could probably be done only 
in an unusual case where there was some substantial 
error unobjected to by inadvertance or neglect of 
counsel and where it was of such critical import 
that it appears likely an unjust conviction resulted 
therefrom. 
Defendant has not alleged incomptency of counsel and 
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it is evident from the record that defendants have had a 
fair trial. Speaking of this subject in a slightly different 
setting, Mr. Chief Justice Crockett on behalf of the court 
said: 
Upon our survey of this record it appears that the 
defendant had what the law entitles him to: a full 
and a fair opportunity, with the aid of competent 
counsel, to present his case to a jury in the manner 
and on the theory he then desired. (The defendants 
in this case waived their right to a jury trial and 
requested the matter be heard before the trial judge 
only.) 
It further appears that after the verdict went against 
him, an effort has been made by other counsel to 
discover some error in the hope of reversal. We 
are firmly committed to the proposition that the 
rules of law and procedure must be adhered to par-
ticularly in a criminal case. But once a fair trial has 
been afforded the defendant and a verdict which is 
supported by the evidence rendered, the proceedings 
are presumed to be valid. We are not disposed to 
reverse for some mere technicalities or irregularities 
unless they put the defendant at some substantial 
disadvantage or had some material bearing on the 
fairness of the proceedings or its outcome. Note 5. 
State v. Valdez, 19 U.2d 426, 429, 432 P.2d 53, 55 
(1967). (Parenthetical added). 
The error in this case was not significant or egregious 
as required by this court in order to notice on appeal ob-
j ections not raised in the trial court below. Further, as res-
pondent has shown, if the trial court's admission of the con-
tested testimony into evidence was error, it did not prejudice 
the defendants in any way since there was oth€r ac~eqi:ate 
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evidence upon which to support a finding that the defend-
ants were guilty. 
POINT IV 
NEITHER THE ADMISSION INTO EVIDENCE 
OF THE FACT THAT THE DEFENDANTS WANTED 
AN ATTORNEY AFTER THEY HAD RECEIVED 
THEIR PREINTERROGATION WARNING NOR THE 
ADMISSION AGAINST INTEREST BY DEFENDANT 
McLAUGHLIN AS IT PERTAINS TO DEFENDANT 
BECKER WERE ERROR, SINCE A JUDGE SITTING 
WITHOUT A JURY IS PRESUMED TO CONSIDER 
ONLY THAT EVIDENCE WHICH IS COMPETENT 
IN ARRIVING AT HIS DECISION. 
Even if it were admitted, which the state does not do, 
that the above two points raised by the appellants were 
.?rror in the trial court, they could not constitute reversible 
error. This is because of the fact that the trial judge under-
stands the law and the rules of evidence and therefore, rather 
than being misled by incompetent or erroneously admitted 
evidence as would the jury in similar circumstances, it is 
presumed that the trial judge in rendering his decision will 
disregard that evidence which is incompetent or in error 
and rely only upon the competent and proper evidence. 
Therefore, if there is other competent evidence which is 
sufficient to support the findings and conclusions of the 
trial judge, his decision will not be disturbed upon appeal 
merely because some incompetent evidence may have been 
introduced into record. In re Goldberry's Estate, 95 U. 379, 
81 P.2d 1186 (1938); In re Hanson's Estate, 87 U. 580, 52 P.2d 
1103 (1935). See also Builder's Steel Co. v. Comm'n. of In-
ternal Revenue, 179 F.2d 377 (8th Cir. 1950). Although the 
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cases cited are civil, we deem the underlying policies and 
reasons to be the same so that the law would apply also in 
criminal cases. 
In Pursche v. Atlas Scraper and Engineering Co., 300 
F.2d 467, 487-488 (1962), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
said: 
Ordinarily the admission of incompetent evidence 
over objection wil! not be grounds for reversal 
when the case is tried to the court sitting without ·a 
jury and there is competent evidence to support the 
findings since the presumption is that the judge 
disregarded the incompetent evidence and relied 
upon the competent evidence. 
There is competent evidence to support the judges de-
cision in this case. First, the incident happened very early 
in the morning at a t'.me when it was highly unlikely that 
anyone else was in the vicinity other than the defendants; 
second, although Mr. Nisson was not in a position to dis-
tinguish features, there was adequate lighting for him to 
distinguish the appearance of defendants in other ways, 
such as clothing, build, mannerisms, etc; third, Nisson was 
able to observe the rear end of the car used by those com-
mitting the crime; and fourth, Mr. Nisson was able to 
identify the defendants and the car as being those he had 
seen at the scene of the crime within about ten minutes 
after the time he first observed them in the act of removing 
the phone. When considering the automobile in which the 
defendants were riding which was of the color and approx-
imate year and possessed the large round taillights described 
by Mr. Nisson and distinctive of a car of that make and 
year, also the time of day at which the incident happened 
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and at which the defendants were apprehended, the fact 
that their car was intercepted nine-tenths of a mile from Mr. 
Nisson's store and the phone booth as it entered the free-
way by Officer Pfoutz, in addition to the fact that defendant 
offered no alibi, made no comment nor offered any evidence 
at the trial, and moreover that it was admitted by McLaugh-
lin prior to being taken into custody that he had been in 
the phone booth with the flimsy excuse that he had been 
there to look for the telephone number of a friend of his 
aunts, the totality of thi~ evidence afford more than ample 
basis for finding that the defendants were guilty. It was up 
to the trial judge sitting in place of the jury at the request 
of the defend'ants to weigh 'these facts and make findings 
in accordance with these facts, inasmuch as he was present 
at the trial and able to observe the testimony of the witnesses 
and the demeanor of both the witnesses and the defendants. 
Therefore, the conviction below is not subject to reversal 
by this court unless it can be determined that all competent 
evidence, taken as a whole, is insufficient for reasonable 
minds to conclude that the de'fendants were guilty beyond 
reasonable doubt. 
CONCLUSION 
It was not error for the judge to allow Officer Pfoutz's 
testimony, to 'the effect that the defendants asked for an at-
torney after they had been given a preinterrogation warn-
ing, to remain in the record. Such a request was not a facit 
admission of guilt. This statement was 'in no way prejudi-
cial nor considered as evidence against the defendants. This 
is p'articularly so where the trial judge, rather than the jury, 
heard the entire case and was well aware of the fact that 
the defendan'ts had right to counsel and that there 
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is no presumption or inference of guilt from such 
request, and that such re q u e·s t would be just as 
likely to come from one who is inno•cent of the 
crime on behalf of his own interest as from one who is 
guilty. Neither was it error as to defendant Becker to admit 
into evidence the declaration by defendant McLaughlin 
that they had not committed the crime maliciously but they 
had done it for money. Solicitation of the reading of the 
complaint by defendant Becker is such that it would be very 
unnatural if an innocent person under the same circum-
stances did not object to the statement. Also in this instance, 
it is presumed that the trial judge, understanding the law 
and having many years of experience in determining issues, 
instructing juries and ruling on motions involving issues 
of evidence and the a<lmissions thereof, would not find the 
defendants guilty if there was insufficient other competent 
evidence to prevent the raising of a reasonable doubt in his 
mind as to their guilt. As a matter of statutory law in this 
state the court will recognize and give effect to errors only 
if they are prejudicial to the defendants. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-42-1 (1953). There is more than ample other competent 
evidence to sustain the defendants guilt, so that admission, 
if error, was not prejudicial. The respondent therefore re-
spectfully prays this court t·o affirm the decision of the 
trial court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
LAUREN N. BEASLEY 
Assistant Attorney General 
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